We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness [62] . Recently, it was shown that Top Trading Cycles is NP-hard to manipulate [32] , a relaxation of strategy-proofness. However, parameterized complexity is a more appropriate framework for this and other economic settings. Certain aspects of the problem -number of objects each agent brings to the table, goods up for auction, candidates in an election [25] , legislative figures to influence [24] -may face natural bounds or are fixed as the problem grows. We take a parameterized complexity approach to indivisible goods exchange for the first time. Our results represent good and bad news for TTC. When the size of the endowments k is a fixed constant, we show that the computational task of manipulating TTC can be performed in polynomial time. On the other hand, we show that this parameterized problem is W[1]-hard, and therefore unlikely to be fixed parameter tractable.
Introduction
In many economic environments, agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, exchange is desirable, and there is no money. For example, workers trading shifts/tasks/assignments, users sharing time blocks on a supercomputer, etc. A rule or mechanism recommends for each possible profile of preferences and endowments a re-allocation of the objects. The general program is to define desirable properties (axioms) and design rules that satisfy as many of them as possible. Three central and well-studied properties are Pareto-efficiency (no rearrangement could make all agents at least as well off, and some better off), individual rationality (no agent is worse off than they started), and strategy-proofness (no agent is better off reporting a lie than their true preference). Unfortunately, in this environment and many others, there is no rule satisfying all three [62] . This motivates the study of properties which are relaxations of strategy-proofness.
We focus on the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism due to Gale. TTC is strategyproof when the endowments are of size 1, but when the endowments are multiple, manipulation is possible. It was recently shown that TTC is NP-hard to manipulate. This result suggests that there may not be an incentive to manipulate TTC, as agents have bounded computational resources. However, the result could be very misleading to policy makers. As we will see, manipulating TTC can be done in time approximately n k , where n is the number of goods and k is the size of the endowments. This does not contradict [32] because the size of the endowment is part of the input to the problem in that paper. Indeed, the hardness reduction makes the implicit assumption that an agent may have a number of goods that grows with the number of agents. Still, when k is large, the algorithm is not practical. If TTC could be manipulated in time f (k)n c for some function f and constant c (i.e. if the problem were fixed parameter tractable) Then TTC would cease to be an attractive rule in the general case. The parameterized complexity of manipulating TTC is therefore an important and interesting question.
Our previously mentioned algorithm is bad news for TTC, but our main result represents good news. We show that manipulating TTC is W [1] -hard (which we define properly later) and therefore very unlikely to be fixed parameter tractable.
Related Literature
We discuss two bodies of related work: the progression of the study of indivisible objects exchange in the economics literature, and recent work in computational social choice.
In 1974, Shapley & Scarf introduced the problem of exchanging indivisible objects without money, also known as the Housing Market [60] . Each agent is endowed one object, may consume one object, and has strict preferences over all objects. They showed that the Top Trading Cycles algorithm (attributed to David Gale) could be used to compute a core allocation. It turns out that the core is unique, and the rule derived from recommending the core for each preference profile is the only Pareto-efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof rule [5, 55, 42, 44, 59, 62, 65] .
Subsequently, the literature considered various generalizations of the model and/or applications of TTC: the case of no ownership [36, 67, 65] , the case where some agents may own nothing (generalizing the two previous cases) [2, 63, 65, 49, 53] , fairer probabilistic rules [1, 8, 6, 11, 15, 16, 22, 21, 23, 35, 41] allowing for indifferences in preferences [4, 9, 14, 37, 52, 54, 56, 64] , School Choice [3, 29, 48, 28, 47, 46] , and dynamic environments [40, 58] . Several authors considered manipulation not by preference misreport but by the merging/splitting/withholding of endowments [7, 18] .
Our paper considers the case when each agent may be endowed with multiple objects [50, 51, 64, 66] . As mentioned, there is no rule satisfying all three properties [62] . In response to this, [51] weakens the Pareto-efficiency requirement to range-efficiency and characterizes the resulting family of rules on a large preference domain. In a complementary manner, [33] shows that in the Lexicographic domain of preferences ATTC satisfies the properties when strategy-proofness is weakened to NP-hard to Manipulate. An immediate corollary of their result is the extension of the statement to larger domains. Other authors consider an environment where objects have types [38, 39, 45, 43, 61] , or where there is no ownership [19, 20] .
The idea of studying the complexity of manipulation was proposed by [10] in response to [34, 57] -the latter showing that, in the environment of voting, requiring strategy-proofness leads to dictatorship. We refer the reader to surveys in the subsequent computational social choice literature [26, 30, 31] , and highlight works that take the parameterized complexity approach [12, 13] .
Preliminaries
Let N be a set of agents and let O be a set of objects. Let ω = {ω i } i∈N be a set of subsets of O such that ω i ∩ ω j = ∅ for all i = j and ∪ω i = O; we call ω i the endowment of agent i. If a good α is in ω i then we say that agent i is the owner of α and that a(α) = i. Let R be the set of all relations over 2 O that are complete, transitive and anti-symmetric. Let R = {R i } i∈N be an element of R |N | ; we call R i the preference relation of agent i, and R the preference profile. We denote the strict component of R i by P i , i.e. XP i Y if and only if XR i Y and ¬Y R i X. We say that E = (N, O, ω, R) is an economy. If |ω i | = 1 for all i we say E is a housing market and otherwise a generalised housing market. If z = {z i } i∈N is a set of disjoint subsets of O such ∪z i = O we say that z is an allocation for the economy E. Note that the endowment is an allocation. A rule φ : R |N | → Z recommends an allocation given a particular preference profile. We denote by φ i (R) the allocation of agent i under φ at R; if φ(R) = z then φ i (R) = z i .
Properties of rules Following standard notation we write (R ′ i , R −i ) to be the preference profile obtained from R by replacing R i with R
A rule φ is strategy-proof if for all economies, no agent has a beneficial misreport under φ. We emphasise that this property implies that no agent can lie even if they have full information about the preferences of the other agents. One trivial example of a strategy-proof rule is the "no deal" rule φ(R) = ω, but this rule is clearly sub optimal. We say that an allocation z is Pareto-optimal for R if for any z ′ we have that z i R i z ′ i and for at least one agent j we do not have that z
We say that a rule is Pareto-efficient (PE) if it always recommends a Pareto-optimal allocation. If an agent might be worse off after the trade according to their own preference relation, there is no incentive to take part. A rule is said to be individually rational (IR) if φ i (R)R i ω i for each agent i.
Graph theory In order to describe the rule that is the focus on this paper, and our results, we require some definitions from graph theory. We follow the definitions in [17] , but we now recall some important notions. A (directed) walk in a graph is an ordered multiset (v 1 , e 1 , v 2 , e 2 , . . . , e k , v k+1 ) where v i is a vertex and e i is a (directed) edge from v i to v i+1 for 1 ≤ i < k. A path is a walk where no vertex is repeated. A cycle is a path plus an edge from v k to v 1 . A clique in a graph G is a set of vertices C such that there is an edge between every pair of vertices in C. A proper colouring (or simply a colouring) of a graph G is an assignment of colours to its vertices such that no edge joins two vertices of the same colour.
Top Trading Cycles For housing markets, there is exactly one rule that is simultaneously SP, PE and IR [62] . The allocation that the rule recommends can be obtained by following the Top Trading Cycles procedure which we define below (see Figure 1 for an example). In a housing market, the endowments are singletons and so any IR rule must also produce an assignment whose elements are singletons. We can assume that each agent has a strict preference relation over O. We introduce the following useful notation: if αP i β for all β in some subset O ′ of the goods, we say that agent i topranks α in O ′ (if O ′ = O we say simply that i topranks α).
Top Trading Cycles
Input: An economy E = (N, O, ω, R). Output: An assignment z.
1. Create a directed graph H 1 whose vertex set is V 1 = O with an edge (α, β) in E t if and only if a(α) topranks β.
2. For t = 1, 2, . . .:
i. Add γ 1 to z a(γj) , and add
iii. Let H t+1 be the directed graph on V t+1 with an edge (α, β) in E t+1 if and only if a(α) topranks β in V t+1 .
In
Step 2b, an arbitrary cycle was selected. Indeed, the order that cycles are removed from the graph in TTC does not matter. However, it will be useful to refer to the time at which goods are traded under TTC. In order to make this notion well-defined, we insist that an economy E is equipped with a total ordering over O; we can refer to the first good in O. Observe that for each good α in V t there is a unique directed walk with no repeated edges starting at α; we call this the trading walk starting at α. Since every element of V t has outdegree 1, this walk must contain a cycle. We define the cycle in Step 2b to be the one contained in the trading walk starting at the first good in V t . We can now define the trading time tt E (α) of a good α in a run of TTC on E to be the least integer t such that α ∈ V t \ V t+1 . When the economy is unambiguous, we write tt(α) = tt E (α). The following simple observations will be very useful later. Observation 1. Suppose α and β are goods in V t during a run of TTC. If the owner of α topranks β in V t , then tt(α) ≥ tt(β).
Observation 3. Suppose α is a good in V t , and the trading walk W starting at α in H t is not a trading cycle. Let β be a good on the trading cycle in W . Then tt(β) < tt(α).
Observe that TTC (as we have described it above) does not require the endowments to be singletons. In other words, it can be applied in the setting of generalised housing markets. However, we know that in this case TTC is not strategy-proof in general. For example, let E = (N, O, ω, R) be the economy shown in Figure 1 . In this economy, a(δ) and a(γ) have the same preferences. Suppose that a(δ) and a(γ) are the same; let ω 1 = {γ, δ}, ω 2 = {α}, ω 3 = {β} for instance. If agent 1 prefers the bundle {α, β} to its assignment {α, δ} there is a possibility for agent 1 to benefit by misreporting their preferences. Agent 1 can report a preference relation R
It is easy to verify that the allocation
In Figure 2 we see a more complicated example. We adopt the convention throughout the paper that denotes a first preference, denotes second preference, denotes third preference, denotes fourth preference, and thereafter a dashed line with i dots denotes the (3 + i)th preference. We set ω 1 = {e 0 , e α , e β }. The preferences of agent 1 are such that any bundle including both α and β is preferable to any bundle including one or the other or neither. Informally, agent 1 wants to get α and β. However, the order of preference of the individual goods, according to R 1 is α, β, e α , e β , e 0 , γ, x, y. In the first round of TTC, the goods α, γ, e 0 form a trading cycle. It can be seen that after these goods are removed, first x, y form a trading cycle, and then β forms a trading cycle. Thus the assignment to agent 1 is {α, e α , e β }. Agent 1 has an incentive to lie; even though x is not preferable to any individual good in ω 1 , obtaining it prevents x, y from forming a trading cycle.
Since manipulation of TTC is clearly possible with multiple endowments, it is necessary to consider relaxing the strict condition that a rule is strategy-proof. Instead, we consider requiring that computing a beneficial misreport is computationally intractable.
Computational complexity We are interested in the complexity of the following problem:
BENEFICIAL MISREPORT(φ) INPUT: A generalised housing market economy E QUESTION: Does agent 1 have a beneficial misreport under φ? For simplicity's sake, we always assume that agent 1 is the would-be liar. Since we are mainly interested in proving (conditional) lower bounds on the complexity of manipulating TTC, we focus on the decision version of the problem. Fujita et al. [32] showed that BM(TTC) is NP-complete in general (they refer to Augmented Top Trading Cycles, but the description is equivalent). This result suggests that TTC might yet be of practical use despite not being SP; an agent with limited computational resources would have no incentive to lie.
However, the hardness established by this result seems to depend heavily on the size of the endowments. Indeed, the proof makes the implicit assumption that one agent may have a number of goods that grows with the number of agents. This strongly suggests that a parameterized approach is more appropriate. In fact, the NP-completeness of the problem could be very misleading; as we shall see later, there is a polynomial time solution to the problem when the size of the endowment is a fixed constant.
Parameterized complexity For a full treatment of the topic of parameterized complexity, we refer the reader to the textbook by Downey and Fellows [27] . We give a brief overview aimed at non-specialists. Consider the following decision problems.
CLIQUE VERTEX COVER INPUT:
Both of these problems are NP-hard, which means that if they can be solved in an amount of time that is polynomial in the total size of the input (G, K) then P = NP. On the other hand, when K is fixed, and not part of the input of the problem, both can be solved in polynomial time. Indeed, CLIQUE can be solved in |G| O(K) time, and VERTEX COVER can be solved in O(2 K |G|) time. It should be clear that there is a big difference in these run times: 2 20 × 1000 operations will take a modern computer mere seconds whereas 1000 20 is larger than the number of atoms in the observable universe. This 2-dimensional approach shows us that the complexity of these problems is very sensitive to the size of the solution sought, and in general a problem's complexity may depend heavily on the size of some parameter in a way that classical complexity ignores.
We define a parameterized language to be a subset of Σ * ×N for some alphabet Σ. If (x, k) is a member of a parameterized language L we say that k is the parameter. If there exists an algorithm which can decide whether (x, k) belongs to L in |x| f (k) for some computable function f , then L is in the complexity class XP. If, additionally, there exists an algorithm that decides membership of L in time f (k) · |x| for an arbitrary function f , then L is in the complexity class FPT. The above discussion shows that VERTEX COVER is in FPT, but CLIQUE is thought not to be.
The fact that CLIQUE is NP-hard is a conditional lower bound for the run time of an algorithm that solves CLIQUE. Since every NP problem reduces to CLIQUE, a polynomial time solution to this problem implies P = NP. An analogous conditional lower bound exists in the parameterized setting. We define the class of W[1] parameterized languages to be those that reduce to the following. Our main result is that BM(TTC), parameterized by the size of the endowments, is W[1]-hard. For the rest of the paper, we refer only to the parameterized version of BM(TTC) In fact, BM(TTC) remains hard under a strong restriction on the preference relations.
Preference domains A preference relation R i is lexicographic if for each X, Y ⊆ O, X P i Y iff there is b ∈ O such that 1) b ∈ X\Y , 2) for each a ∈ O with a P i b, a ∈ X ∩ Y . The lexicographic, additive, responsive, and monotonic domains are ordered by inclusion 1 . Our result holds even on the lexicographic domain; it immediately holds for the more general domains.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that all agents have lexicographic preference relations unless stated otherwise. This allows us to write the preference relations in a compressed format. We may write the preference relation of an agent i as a list of the singletons ordered by R i , up to and including the least preferred element of ω i .
The Main Result
In order to prove that BM(TTC) is W[1]-hard, we introduce an auxiliary problem; our reduction is ultimately from the following problem.
MULTICOLOUR CLIQUE INPUT:
A graph G with a proper vertex colouring φ PARAMETER: The number of colours k QUESTION: Does there exists a clique of size k in G?
In order to simplify our exposition, we introduce an intermediate problem which we will prove is W[1]-hard and reduce to BM(TTC). In a directed graph G with a proper vertex colouring φ :
, an edge (u, v) with φ(v) = φ(u) + 1 will be called a rung. On the other hand if φ(v) < φ(u), we say that (u, v) is a snake. A partial ladder in such a graph is a set of k vertices {v 1 , . . . , v j } such that (v i , v i+1 ) is a rung for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1. A (partial) ladder is snakeless if there are no snakes between its vertices. We define the problem of deciding the existence of a snakeless ladder in a k-coloured graph as follows:
SNAKELESS LADDER INPUT:
A directed graph G with a proper vertex colouring φ 1 A preference relation R i is monotonic if for each X, Y ⊆ O such that Y ⊆ X, X R i Y . A preference relation R i is responsive if for each X ⊂ O, and each a, b ∈ O\X, X ∪ {a} PARAMETER: The number of colours k QUESTION: Does G contain a snakeless ladder?
Proof. The proof is a simple reduction from MULTICOLOUR CLIQUE. From a k-coloured graph G we obtain a directed graph G ′ by first complementing the set of edges between non-adjacent colour classes. In other words if |φ(u) − φ(v)| = 1, then uv is an edge in G ′ if and only if it was not an edge in G. We then direct the edge uv from u to v if Proof. We reduce from SNAKELESS LADDER. Let G be a graph with a proper k-colouring for some integer k. We will obtain an economy E G and an integer k ′ such that the endowment of player 1 in E G has size k ′ and furthermore player 1 has a beneficial misreport R ′ 1 if and only if there is a snakeless ladder in G. We will then show that E G , k ′ can be constructed in time f (k)|G| c for some function f and constant c. We begin the construction of E G = (N, O, ω, R) by setting ω 1 = e α , e β ∪ {e j : 1 ≤ j ≤ k}. We can assume that all other agents have a singleton endowment. For each vertex v i in G, we add to E G a vertex gadget. A vertex gadget is a pair of goods x i , y i and their respective owners, who have particular preferences depending on the colour and neighbourhood of v i . The agent a(y i ) always topranks x i , and a(x i ) topranks e j where j is the colour of v i . The full preference relation of a(x i ) is (e j , y i , x i ). The preferences of a(y i ) are as follows. Let v s1 , v s2 , . . . be the endpoints of the snakes which start at v i and let v r1 , v r2 , . . . be the endpoints of the rungs which start at v i . For a vertex v i of colour k, the full preference relation of a(y i ) is (x i , y s1 , y s2 , . . . , e β , y i ). For a vertex v i not of colour k, the full preference relation of a(y i ) is (x i , y s1 , y s2 , . . . , y r1 , y r2 , . . . , y i ). Note that a(y i ) prefers each of the goods representing the snakes of v i to each of the goods representing the rungs. In Figure 4 we see three vertex gadgets. For i = 1, 2, 3 we have that v i has colour i and we see that (v 2 , v 1 ) is a snake and (v 2 , v 3 ) is a rung. Table 1 : The preferences of some agents in E G (v i has colour j)
We continue our construction by the addition of three goods (and their respective owners) α, β, γ. The full preference relation of a(α) is (γ, α). The full preference relation of a(γ) is (e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e k , e α , γ). The preference relation of a(β) is as follows. Suppose v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v j are the vertices of colour 1 in G in an arbitrary order. The full preference relation of a(β) is (γ, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y j , β). Note that a(β) prefers all goods representing vertices of colour 1 to β and that β is preferred to all other goods representing vertices.
The construction is completed by revealing the true preference relation of agent 1; namely, (α, β, e α , e β , e k , e k−1 , . . . , e 1 ). For clarity, we have provided Table 1 which shows the preferences of the agents described above. In Figure 5 we see an example of an economy constructed from the graph G in Figure 3 . The preferences of agent 1 are omitted. When agent 1 reports the truth, the assignment received is {α, e α , e β , e k , . . . , e 2 }.
Claim 7. If there is a beneficial misreport
Proof. The two best goods obtained by agent 1 by reporting the truth are α and e α . By the lexicographic property of R 1 , any bundle preferred by agent 1 to its true assignment must include α since agent 1 topranks α. Similarly, a preferred bundle must include a good that is preferred by agent 1 to e α . The only such good is β.
The only bundles agent 1 prefers to their true assignment include both α and β. The reader may wish to verify that there is no beneficial misreport available to agent 1 in the economy in Figure 3 . This is in contrast with Figure 2 , where agent 1 was able to prevent x, y forming a trading cycle by obtaining x, and therefore obtain both α and β. If agent 1 tries the misreport (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , α, β) it is easy to see that y 1 , y 2 , y 3 will at some point form a trading cycle. Thus β will form a trading cycle on its own and not be included in the assignment to agent 1. This is because v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , v 4 is not a snakeless ladder in G. If the snake (v 3 , v 1 ) was omitted from G, then G would have a snakeless ladder and y 3 would no longer prefer y 1 to y 4 .
We now formalise this intuition and argue that agent 1 has a beneficial misreport in E G if and only if G has a snakeless ladder. Suppose that L = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k ) is a snakeless ladder in G (so v i has colour i in G). We claim that R ′ 1 = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k , α, β, e 1 , . . . , e k , e α , e β ) is a beneficial misreport. We abuse our terminology slightly and say that if v i is of colour j, then x i , y i are goods of colour j. Let E ′ G be the economy obtained from E G by replacing R 1 by R ′ 1 , and consider a run of TTC on E ′ G . For the rest of this proof, we will write tt(δ) = tt E ′ (δ) for the trade time of a good δ during a run of TTC on E ′ . It is clear that in H 1 , there is a trading cycle e 1 , x 1 . After this is removed, there will be a trading cycle e 2 , x 2 . Observe that of all the vertices of colour 1 and 2 in G, only v 1 and v 2 are represented by goods in H tt(e2)+1 . Furthermore, a(y 1 ) topranks y 2 in V tt(e2)+1 . Now e 3 , x 3 form a trading cycle, and after this is removed, only y 3 remains among the goods of colour 3. Since L is a snakeless ladder, Figure 5 :
The economy E G associated with the graph in Figure 3 a(y 3 ) prefers each good of colour 4 to y 1 . Similarly, we have that a(y i ) topranks a(y i+1 ) in
, and so agent 1 topranks α in H tt(e k )+1 (according to the false preference relation R ′ 1 ), and a(γ) topranks e α . Thus, e α , α, γ form a trading cycle. The assignment of agent 1 under R ′ 1 includes α as required. Since γ is not in V tt(α)+1 , so a(β) topranks y 1 , the only remaining good of colour 1. Furthermore, α is not in V tt(α)+1 , so agent 1 topranks β in H tt(α)+1 . Finally, e β , β, y 1 , . . . , y k form a trading cycle, and β is included in the assignment to agent 1.
Suppose instead that there exists a beneficial misreport R ′ 1 for agent 1. We show that the trading cycle in H tt(β) that contains β is of the form (β, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k , e β ) where v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v k is a snakeless ladder in G. We now demonstrate that αP ′ 1 β must hold. By Observation 1, we have that tt(γ) ≤ tt(α). On the other hand, if tt(γ) < tt(α), then a(α) topranks α in V tt(γ)+1 ; thus a(α) keeps α, a contradiction. This shows that tt(α) = tt(γ). Observation 1 also gives us that tt(γ) ≤ tt(β), and by Observation 2 this inequality is strict. This shows that tt(α) < tt(β). Since α and β are both in the assignment to agent 1 by assumption, we must have αP ′ 1 β. Observation 1 also tells us that tt(e 1 ) ≤ tt(γ). We show that this inequality is strict If tt(e 1 ) = tt(γ), then e 1 , α, γ form a trading cycle in H tt(e1) . Then in H tt(e1)+1 , each pair of colour 1 forms a trading cycle. By Observation 3, no pair of colour 1 is in H tt(β) , and β forms a trading cycle with itself, contradicting the definition of R ′ 1 . In H tt(e1)+1 , the agent a(γ) topranks e 2 . Again, by Observation 1 we have that tt(e 2 ) ≤ tt(γ). A very similar argument to the above shows that this inequality is strict. Indeed, since β does not form a trading cycle on its own by assumption, there must be at least one good y i of colour 1 in H tt(β) . Since there must be a trading cycle including β in H tt(β) , the good x i cannot be in H tt(β) . If tt(e 2 ) = tt(γ), every pair of colour 2 forms a trading cycle in H tt(e2)+1 . Thus no pair of colour 2 is in H tt(β) , so y i forms a trading cycle with itself a contradiction.
Proceeding by induction, we see that tt(e i ) < tt(α) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Consider H tt(α) . For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the goods e i are not in V tt(α) . The only other good that a(γ) ranks above γ is e α . Thus the trading cycle in H tt(α) containing α must be α, γ, e α . Now consider H tt(β) . Suppose y i is a good of colour j in V tt(β) . Then, without loss of generality, x i is not in V tt(β) , since we have shown e j is not, and the order in which cycles are removed is arbitrary. Moreover, suppose there are distinct goods y i , y i ′ of colour j in V tt(β) . By Observation 1, tt(e j ) ≤ tt(x i ) and tt(e j ) ≤ tt(x i ′ ). By Observation 2, tt(x i ) = tt(x i ′ ). Thus e j must have been in a trading cycle with at most one of x i , x i ′ . Without loss of generality, tt(e j ) is strictly less than tt(x i ), and y i , x i form a trading cycle in H tt(ej )+1 , a contradiction.
The trading walk in H tt(β) starting at β must be a trading cycle. Since γ is not in V tt(β) , there must be exactly one good y i of colour 1 in V tt(β) . Without loss of generality, that good is y 1 . The agent a(y 1 ) only ranks goods of the form y j of colour 2 above y 1 in V tt(β) . As we have discussed, there must be exactly one such good; without loss of generality, that good is y 2 . We proceed by induction. Suppose there is a path P in H tt(β) of the form (β, y 1 , . . . , y i ) where y i is of colour i. Observe that v 1 , . . . , v i−1 must be a snakeless partial ladder, though there may yet be a snake (v i , v i ′ ) with i ′ < i. However, if a(y i ) topranks some good y i ′ ∈ P with i ′ < i then the trading walk starting at β is not a cycle, which is a contradiction. All other goods of colour less than i are omitted from V tt(β) , as is x i . Thus a(y i ) topranks a good of colour i + 1 in V tt(β) . Without loss of generality, that good is y i+1 . Observe that v 1 , ldots, v i is a snakeless partial ladder, and that there is a path in H tt(β) of the form (β, y 1 , . . . , y i+1 ). We conclude that there is a path of the form (β, y 1 , . . . , y k ) in H tt(β) , and by the same argument, y k must toprank e β . In other words, we have that v 1 , . . . , v k is a snakeless ladder as required.
An Upper Bound
We leave the possibility of a matching upper bound on the complexity of BM(TTC) (i.e. a proof of membership in W [1] ) as an interesting open problem. We conclude the paper with an upper bound that nevertheless represents a negative result for TTC. Informally, if the size of the endowments is a fixed constant, BM(TTC) can be decided in polynomial time. In fact, our result is slightly stronger, in that we present an explicit constructive algorithm that can produce a beneficial misreport. We also highlight that this result holds regardless of the preference domain.
Proposition 8. BM(TTC) is in XP.
Proof. We will show that the following algorithm computes a beneficial misreport, if one exists, for agent 1 in time at most k!n k+c where n is the number of goods, k is the size of the endowment and c is a constant associated with the runtime of TTC.
Algorithm A Input: An economy E = (N, O, ω, R). Output: An beneficial misreport for agent 1.
1. Let ω 1 = {e 1 , . . . , e k } be the endowment of agent 1.
2. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m be the bundles of size k such that X i R 1 ω 1 for each i (ordered according to R 1 ).
3. For i = 1, 2, . . . , m: 
Return 0
The correctness of our algorithm is a corollary of the following claim. Proof. Let E ′ and E ′′ be the (otherwise identical) economies in which agent 1 reports R and H ′ tt ′ (γ1) are identical. Since γ 1 is assigned to agent 1 in E ′ , it must also be assigned to agent 1 in E ′′ . The claim follows by induction.
Thus if there is a beneficial misreport such that the assignment to agent 1 is X = {γ 1 , . . . , γ k }, then it is enough to check only those misreports that rank the goods in X above any other goods.
It remains for us to analyse the runtime of Algorithm A. There are at most n k ≤ n k bundles that agent 1 can prefer above the endowment. There are k! different permutations of a bundle of size k. So Step 3(c)ii is performed at most k!n k times. In this step, TTC is called. Since TTC takes polynomial time to perform (it takes at most n steps to find a cycle, and at least one good is removed for each time step), there exists a constant c such that this step takes at most n c time. The overall run time is therefore at most k!n k+c as required.
